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Prepaid Legal Services: More Than
an Open and Closed Case
William Martin Greene*
T HE AGE OF PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES is upon us. Bar associa-
tions throughout the country are planning and organizing bar-
sponsored programs of legal insurance. Labor unions and other asso-
ciations have formed, or are forming, various group legal service
arrangements. In general, the organized bar favors the so-called
"open panel" system for the delivery of prepaid legal services to the
middle class. The open panel is essentially a fee-for-service program
of legal insurance. Organized labor, as well as other influential spokes-
men, support "closed panel" arrangements, whereby a group or asso-
ciation of any type retains either a private law firm or establishes
its own law firm to serve its members' needs for particular legal
services. The question of which system will best serve the needs of
that broad mass of persons defined as "middle class," is a subject of
sharp debate between attorneys and laymen alike. This article ex-
amines the recent history of the prepaid movement, focuses on the
respective arguments favoring both the open and the closed panel,
and concludes on a cautionary note as to the paucity of research sub-
stantiating and defining the specific legal needs of the diverse sub-
groupings constituting the middle class, while warning of the dangers
inherent in viewing prepaid services as a singular solution for the
fulfillment of these needs.
Background and History
In 1966 the American Bar Association retained Professor Preble
Stolz of the University of California School of Law (Boult Hall) to
conduct a study of the feasibility of legal insurance. Stolz, together
with a group of consulting actuaries, published the results of their
study, concluding:
Legal insurance is a possible way of financing legal
service for individuals of modest means. A plan can be con-
structed that would not be too costly to be sold. For the most
part the services that would be purchased through insurance
are low cost, preventive law services that the public is not
now buying. The primary value of legal insurance would be
as a way of encouraging people to use more legal services.
For selected groups, legal insurance would be more attrac-
tive than group legal services, but in general, legal insur-
ance can not achieve the economics of scale possible through
group legal services. Legal insurance, accordingly, is far
* AB., Ohio State Univ.; J.D. Western Reserve Univ.; Member of the Ohio and California
Bars.
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from a complete answer to those concerned about the eco-
nomic threat of a group legal services, nor it is likely to
revolutionize the economics of law practice.1
The American Bar Association's Special Committee on Prepaid
Legal Services, apparently undaunted by the limited utility of legal
insurance programs as suggested by Professor Stolz, proceeded to
conduct three major conferences on the subject of Prepaid Legal
Services2 (dealing mainly with the open panel) as well as instituting
an open panel pilot project in Shreveport, Louisiana. As of January
1, 1973, the A.B.A. reported that local and state bar association inter-
est had grown so intense that at least twenty-two state bar associa-
tions had held discussions on the topic, or had introduced programs
of bar-sponsored legal insurance; that the A.B.A.'s special committee
on Prepaid Legal Services had given information and technical as-
sistance to the planning efforts of state and local bar associations;
that the California Lawyer's Service (a bar-sponsored program) had
conducted four meetings and is already negotiating with its first
group clients; that Washington and Colorado were about to form
similar programs; that state bars in Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Utah were past initial plan-
ning discussions; that New Jersey and Wisconsin were developing
programs to be offered through existing Blue Cross Administrations;
and that two major insurance companies, estimating that some twenty-
three percent of the American public is willing to purchase legal
insurance, have announced plans to begin experimental programs
in 1973.1
This massive and almost frenzied movement of the bar toward
group legal services is not without its historical antecedents or eco-
nomic underpinnings. The organized bar, historically hostile toward
any form of group legal services,' was ironically the protagonist in
I Stolz, Insurance For Legal Services, 35 U.CHI.L.REv. 417, 476 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Stolz].
2 At Los Angeles in Nov. 1971; at New Orleans in Feb. 1972; and at Washington, D.C. in
April, 1972.
3 The Shreveport program was instituted as a pilot project for members of Laborer's Local
No. 229, in Shreveport, Louisiana. The project was jointly funded by the Ford Foundation,
the American Bar Association, and the American Bar Endowment.
4 18 A.B.A. NESS, Jan., 1973, at 4.
5 The general view of the organized bar was that collective efforts of a group toward obtain-
ing legal representation for its members was a violation of the A.B.A. CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS NOS. 27 and 35 (prohibiting advertising and the interposition of lay
intermediaries between lawyer and client). See generally, Elson, The Canons of Ethics and
the Providing of Legal Services, 33 TENN.L.REv. 171 (1966); Markus, Group Representa.
tion by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14 CLEvE.MAR.L.RV. 1 (1963); Weihofen, Practice of
Law by Motor Clubs - Ureful but Forbidden, 3 U.CHI.L.REv. 296; Legal Aid Programs of
a Labor Union and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 U.PITT.L.Rav. 85 (1958); The
Emergence of Lay Intermediaries Furnishing Legal Services to Individuals, 1965 WASH.
VOL. Q. 313 (1965); Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations Providing the
Services of Attorneys, 72 HARv.L.REv. 1334 (1959).
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a series of court decisions which were to guarantee the existence of
such plans. In 1963 and 1964, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided two cases, NAACP v. Button,6 and Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,' involving collective efforts of two
groups to assist in obtaining limited legal representation for their
members. In the Brotherhood case, Justice Black, delivering the
opinion of the court, stated:
Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their
rights when dealing with practiced carefully counseled ad-
versaries [citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335] and
for them to associate together to help one another to preserve
and enforce rights granted them under federal law cannot
be condemned as a threat to legal ethics. The state can no
more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan
to advise one another than it would use more direct means
to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their
legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so
handicapped.'
Despite the comparatively clear language and intent of the
NAACP and Brotherhood cases, the Court found it necessary to twice
more grant certiorari in related matters over the next seven years.
In both instances, the Court found as violative of the first amend-
ment, bar association activities to curtail group legal efforts. In
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association (1967)1 the
Court, in a case involving the legality of a state court injunction
barring a union local from providing or referring its members to an
attorney for representation in workman's compensation cases, stated:
We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and peti-
tion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis
to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.
10
Four years later, the so-called "Burger Court" gave final notice
that they would not distinguish away prior court holdings. In United
Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar Association" a case wherein
the union referred members to attorneys with whom the union had a
fee ceiling arrangement, the court stated:
6371 U.S. 415 (1963).
7377 U.S. 1 (1964).
1Id, at 7.
9389 U.S. 217 (1967).
'Old. at 221-22.
"401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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The common thread running throughout our decisions in
NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is
that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful ac-
cess to the court is a fundamental right within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. However, that right would
be a hollow promise if courts could deny an association of
workers or others, the means of enabling their members to
meet the cost of legal representation. 2
The bar associations were not without their economic justifica-
tion in seeking to suppress or limit union activities in legal services.
It was suspected by many that a great number of formal or informal
closed panel group arrangements existed. With the advent of the
aforementioned court decisions, many of these group arrangements
began to emerge from their cocoon of self-imposed obscurity. Cali-
fornia was viewed as the hotbed of such arrangements, as later evi-
denced by the results of a registration requirement, wherein every
lawyer involved in a group arrangement was obligated to make public
record of his participation." By November of 1971, it was reported
that 83 lawyers or law firms had arrangements with 218 groups with
a statewide membership estimated between 300,000 to 750,000 indi-
viduals, and that registrations were increasing at a rapid rate.14
Given the difficulties of financing such plans in advance of Congres-
sional legislation," it is small wonder that such statistics alarmed
many with a vested interest in the economics of private practice.
Indeed, the American Bar Association, citing Stolz' study as estab-
lishing "that for the first time a serious student working with actu-
arial assistants has concluded that such a plan is feasible, 6 urged the
interested, organized bar to foster and promote "plans based upon
insurance principles and incorporating the concept of free choice of
attorney . . . [and] . . . to move swiftly to cut through the myriad
problems involved in setting up such programs."'17 As stated earlier,
by 1973, state bar associations, with the aid of the American Bar
Association, had moved strongly ahead with the structure and im-
plementation of such programs.
121d. at 585-6.
13 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20 (1970)
"Address by Philip J. Murphy, Conference on the Development of Prepaid Legal Services,
Nov. 12, 1971.
15 See p. 430 infra.
16 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, REPORT AND IECOM-
MENDATION, in REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVlCES 25 (April, 1972). This
report was first adopted in Fcb., 1968.
17 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL COST ISUIANCE, REPORT, in REVISED
HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 33 (April, 1972). This report was first adopted
in Feb., 1971.
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Meanwhile, another powerful interest group, organized labor,
publically endorsed the closed panel. The AFL-CIO executive council
released a statement on May 2, 1972 clarifying their long-standing
position on legal services:
Legal services for union members and their families can best
be provided through union or community sponsored prepaid
legal service plans. The alternative, open-ended fee for service
arrangements, permits no effective cost controls and would
lead to the same kind of runaway cost escalation many
unions have suffered in fee-for-service medical programs.1 8
Within the general but still unproven assumption that local and
state bar associations were now effectively out of the business of
regulating and terminating collective efforts toward group legal
services, several labor unions instituted comprehensive legal service
plans. 19 Laborer's Local 423 in Columbus, Ohio, for example, began
what is perhaps the most comprehensive plan in the nation.
One does not have to look far to understand labor's especial con-
cern with legal services, for the labor unions, with their massive
group memberships and employer-pay benefit programs, are ideal
spawning grounds for such plans. There exist, however, several re-
maining obstacles to the full implementation of both open and closed
plans. If and when these obstacles are alleviated, the widespread
utilization of legal service plans will be a reality.
The Obstacles
The major obstacle facing prepaid plans is Section 302 of the
Taft Hartley Act. This section prohibits employer contributions to
jointly administered trust funds for all but certain narrowly defined
purposes.2' Without such status as a fringe benefit, comprehensive
prepaid plans face seemingly insurmountable difficulties. Few unions,
for example, have the requisite monetary resources to finance pro-
grams from union dues. Still fewer unions now have memberships
that are willing or able to finance prepaid plans out of their own
pocket; even if they were so willing, the administrative, accounting,
and collection problems inherent in such a scheme would provide dif-
ficult and expensive obstacles.
'B Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Prepaid Legal Services, Washington, D.C.
(May 2, 1972).
' For an amusing view of a restrictive reading of the U.T.U. case, see Stolz, Sesame Street for
Lawyers: A Dramatic Rendition of U.T.U. v. State Bar of Michigan, 36 UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE NEws 14 (Nov. 1971).
20 This plan covers unlimited legal advice and consultation, 80 hours of legal services during
each calendar year in connection with up to five matters per calendar year, and costs and ex-
penses incurred in connection with rendition of legal services. Exempted are contingent fee
matters, suits against the union or another member, collections, income tax preparation, and
business ventures.
2 29 U.S.C. §186.
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Although some commentators have proposed that Section 302 (C)
(6)22 of the Taft Hartley Act (a 1959 amendment permitting trust
contributions for the purpose of pooled vacations, holiday, severance,
or other similar benefits) may be interpreted to embrace legal services
under the guise of "similar benefits," the more reasonable view is
that statutory modifications will be necessary in order to place legal
services alongside medical services as a permissible fringe benefit.
To accomplish this end, legislation has been introduced in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Passage of the bill is ex-
pected, as both organized labor and the organized bar, mindful of the
necessity for such legislation to both the open and closed panel, are
lobbying strongly in its behalf.
Another stumbling block is Section 501 (C) (9)23 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which provides tax-exempt status for voluntary em-
ployee beneficiary associations providing for the payment of life,
sickness, accident, and other benefits to its members. Whether or not
a legal service trust would be an exempt entity is dependent on the
Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of this section. Additionally,
it appears that benefits paid by group legal plans are taxable income
to the recipient. Since medical benefits are tax exempt, there would
appear little reason not to provide similar treatment for legal services.
One can imagine the incredulity of a worker receiving $5,000.00 in
legal benefits only to find such an item includable in his gross income.
Since such factors would unduly inhibit most types of legal service
plans, many responsible commentators urge a more liberal reading
of the term "other benefits" in §501(C) (9) and, if necessary, Con-
gressional modifications of the relevant code provisions.2 5 When in
fact such modifications become reality, the age of prepaid legal
services will be fully ushered in. It is perhaps not too bombastic to
assert that in many respects the private practice of law will never
again be the same.
The Need for Prepaid Legal Services
Both the open and closed panel approach begin with the under-
lying assumption of the failure of the present legal system to ade-
quately represent the middle class. While there is little hard data
to support a claim that the middle class is being deprived of legal
services,26 there appears to be a widespread acceptance of such a
"29 U.S.C. §186(c) (6).
2326 U.S.C. §501(c) (9).
226 U.S.C. §105 (b).
"See Bernstein, Futurae Growth and Direction of Prepaid Legal Services, Collective Bargain-
ing, and the Role of Labor, in PREPAID LEGAL SERVICEs 69 (Nov. 1971).
26 Stol, sapra note 1, at 419; see also P. STOLZ, TIE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: A
SuRvEY ANALYSIS (Research Contribs. of Am Bar Found. No. 4, 1968).
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need. The A.B.A.'s Special Committee on Prepaid Legal Services as-
serts, "[T]he association has long been aware that the middle 70%
of our population is not being reached or served adequately by the
legal profession."'" Other commentators more harshly suggest that
the legal profession is adequately serving less than one-third of the
people of the United States,28 the great majority of these legally neg-
lected being broadly classified as people of moderate means. Since the
middle class has been variously defined to encompass approximately
128,000,000 persons with incomes between $5,000. and $15,000;29 or
sixty-three percent of the population with incomes between $6,000
and $18,000,11 the scope of the defined problem of providing adequate
legal services for this populace is indeed staggering, and will of
necessity require the emergence of new institutions into the practice
of law.
This asserted legal dilemma of the middle class, while general-
ized and largely unsubstantiated, is nevertheless easy to conceptualize.
The poor, due to their classification as "indigents," have been af-
forded some semblance of access to legal representation by tradi-
tional legal aid societies, the O.E.O. Legal Service Program, and
various decisions of the United States Supreme Court.31 The wealthy,
on the other hand, can abundantly afford to finance their own legal
expenses. The middle class wage earner, however, does not qualify
for government-assisted legal aid, and arguably can not afford the
hourly fees of forty dollars and upward billed by most attorneys for
legal services.32
The failure of the legal profession to provide for the "little man"
is not surprising when one considers that the profession has never
really been geared toward serving the working man, but rather has
been fostered and subsidized to cater to business and property inter-
2TABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, INTRODUCTION, in R-EVISED
HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 1. 2 (April, 1972).
B, CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 5 (1970).
2918 A.B.A. NEWS, spra note 4.
30 Tolley, Putting Group Legal Plans On Retainer For Middle America, PENSION WELFARE
NEWS, June, 1972 at 32.
31 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel for indigent accused of a mis-
demeanor for which a jail sentence may be imposed); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel for an indigent accused of a felony); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640 (1948) (right to counsel for an indigent accused of a capital offense).
32 This figure of $40 per hour is gleaned from minimum fee schedules published by the Ohio
Bar Assoc. in 1972. While one suspects that lawyer's fees will continue to rise, minimum fee
schedules have recently come under attack as being violative of section one of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. Such a theory was recently adopted by a federal district court in Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 1973 Trade Cas. 74.318 (E.D. Va. 1973). The position of the court
was in accord with the attitude of the Justice Department. Since Goldfarb, many minimum
fee schedules are being abandoned. See interview with Donald Baker, Chief of Antitrust
Division's Policy Planning, 606 ATRR AA-4 (Mar- 27, 1973)
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ests.3  While such a focus may have been quite appropriate in the
nineteenth century, it is particularly unfortunate today. With the
increasing consumer power of the workingman, the expansion of
past "New Deal" government into the lives of the populace, and the
newly perceived involvement of Americans in the criminal justice
system,34 more and more persons are directly in need of legal as-
sistance to aid them in navigating the sea of legal problems pre-
sented by contemporary existence.
As a natural consequence of this alleged failure on the part of
the profession, contact between attorneys and the middle class has
been comparatively slight, and when occasioned, is often fraught with
distrust and fear. Many workers have little understanding of the
functions of an attorney, and thus are unable to perceive when one
is needed. Furthermore, there appears to be some evidence that much
of the public distrusts the law in general, and attorneys in particular. 5
If such a general view of the middle class is correct, the problem of
providing legal services for this group clearly transcends (but by no
means excludes) prohibitive legal fees; and thus the solutions should
also address themselves toward alleviating the barriers between the
profession and a large segment of the public.
The Closed Panel
The closed panel is structured to provide legal services to any
type of group or association. While plans differ as to extent of cover-
age, two general types are possible: (1) a house counsel arrange-
ment, whereby the group retains attorneys on a full-time basis to
represent its members, and (2) a private law firm retained by the
group pursuant to a contractual arrangement. To a varying degree,
it can be persuasively argued that such arrangements appear not only
more economical than legal insurance, but also that they embody a
preferred structure for the massive conditioning effort needed to
educate a distrustful and legally naive middle America.
While the existence per se of a legal insurance policy may well
in the long run encourage contact with an attorney, it is difficult to
perceive an insurance company in the role of educating its policyhold-
ers to claim benefits. Such a role, of course, could be assumed by
33 Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contracts, 34 AM.Soc.REv. 309 (1969).
I use the term "'newly perceived" to reflect the fact that more accurate statistical systems
have only recently disclosed the extent and percentage of the populace involved in the crim-
inal justice. The Presidnt's Commission on Law Enforcment, for example, reported that as
of 1965, one boy in six was sent to juvenile court; that forty per cent of all male children
would be arrested for nontraffic offenses during their lives; that ninety-one per cent of a
sampled group of 1,700 people admitted they had committed criminal acts. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY(1967)
31 See Stolz, supra note 1, at 420 n. 14.
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bar associations and educators, but one suspects that the present
lack of legal sophistication of the working class would attest to past
shortcomings of the two in this regard. The insured group, on the
other hand, could serve as a source of educational input for its mem-
bers. Relying on brochures and lecturers, the group could conduct its
own educational programs. While such an approach may be useful
for highly-educated group memberships, its widespread utility is
doubtful. It is the author's personal experience that all too many
people ignore mail-outs and off-the-job lectures. In addition, many
lack the necessary skills to comprehend and practically apply such
material.
The closed panel, however, would tend to encourage frequent
personal contact aimed at both education and "preventive legal care."
To this end, an annual legal check-up 36 would be suggested. Such a
device would serve a threefold purpose: first, it would tend to dispel
fear and suspicion of attorneys by allowing the client to become
familiar and presumably comfortable with the group attorney; sec-
ond, it would enable the skilled attorney to review the legal picture
of each client, and institute a program of preventive legal care; and
finally, it would afford a suitable milieu for client education as to
what situations and problems require consultation.
While legal insurance could conceivably provide for a legal
check-up in its benefit schedule, no known system has yet to do so.
The closest analogous benefit is an allowance for "advice and con-
sultation." The A.B.A.'s pilot insurance project at Shreveport, for
example, provides allowance for a maximum of four yearly visits to
an attorney for purposes of advice and consultation. Although the
administrators of the plan (Southwest Administrators, A Division
of Jackson-Hardin, Inc., New Orleans, Louisiana), expected about
one-half of all claims to be for advice and consultation, 7 statistics
from the first two years indicate that such consultations accounted
for only 1% of the fees paid by the plan. Significantly, in a two year
period, only seven of approximately six hundred union members are
recorded as having sought consultation. While such statistics may be
somewhat misleading,r it is probable that few attorneys utilized the
occasions for preventive legal care. While drawing concrete analogies
from Shreveport may be dangerous, this statistic, in itself, is rather
alarming.
2 The idea of a preventive "legal checkup" is discussed in an address prepared by Danny R.
Jones for the Calif. Trial Lawyer's Ass'n Convention in San Francisco, Feb. 26, 1972 [here-
inafter referred to as Jonesi. Mr. Tones cites Brown, U. So. CAL, SCHOOL OF LAW PREVEN-
TIVE LAW NEWSLETTER, June, 1971.
37 Preliminary report of Southwest Administrators, Inc. (Sept. 1969).
a1 Id. at 19.
1973]
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The economic factor has been the most frequently-voiced criticism
of the open panel. The argument is that the high administrative costs
and abusive billing practices in union-sponsored, open panel medical
plans suggest that similar legal insurance plans will be far more ex-
pensive than the closed panel.39 Until there is more definitive statistical
evidence, however, one can, at best, only make a rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of this argument. Such a presumption would appear
further justified in light of the economics of scale" available to an
"enlightened" closed panel practice. Moreover, it is asserted that a
"lawyer working on a retainer salary for a group has no motivation
to inflate the amount of work that he does for a particular client. '41
The ideal closed panel would copy, to some extent, the practice of
the large corporation firms, of employing specialists in the areas most
needed by their clients. 42 The specialists would serve much the same
function as their corporate brethren, in that they would bring greater
efficiency and effectiveness to their professional work by virtue of
their expertise in one major area. Most attorneys in general practice
would testify to the time saved and quality of work performed when
working in their special areas. As time is indeed money in the legal
profession, the costs saved by such an approach should be considerable.
Full implementation of the paraprofessional would be desirable
to augment and complement the work of the specialist. Not only can
the paraprofessional perform many of the time-consuming tasks
hitherto handled by the higher-priced attorney, but a trained para-
professional can also perform most legal tasks of an attorney with
the exception of court appearances and client consultations.A
Other non-legal personnel would be of great use to such an office.
An office administrator and efficiency expert, for example, may be
desired to allocate and oversee workloads, dockets, office supplies, etc.,
"SHREVEPORT BAR AssoCA IION, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICE PLAN, A COMPILATION OF
BASIC DOCUMENTS (1973).
11 Stolz, supra note 1, at 472.
41 Id.
11 Jones, supra note 36.
'In fact, almost every legal task can be delegated to a paraprofessional (other than counseling
dicnts and appearing in court or other formal proceedings) so long as "the lawyer main-
tains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated and has capable profes-
sional responsibility for the work product.'" A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITy, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 3-6 (1960). Thus, a California appellate court found that it
was permissible for a lay legal specialist to prepare complaints, demurrers, orders for and
affidavit of publication of summons in divorce cases, bills of sale, and bankruptcy petitions,
as this work was considered more preparatory than integral to a lawyer's work product.
Johnson v. Davidson, 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 P. 159 (1921). However, in Fe-ris v. Snively,
172 Wash. 167, 19 P_ 942 (193.3), the Washington Supreme Court established definite
limits to the legal activities which a layman could perform. There a specialist prepared wills,
leases, mortgages, bills of sale, and contracts, and probated small estates, without the super-
vision of an attorney. The court held that the lay specialist was practicing law without a
(Continued on next page)
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as well as to hopefully implement timesaving forms. A social worker
or marriage counselor could be retained by the law firm in areas
where legal help is often sought, perhaps inappropriately.44 Once
again, substantial cost savings would be expected, while quality should
not suffer, and may well be enhanced. More importantly, it is difficult
to imagine any legal insurance plan utilizing any of the aforemen-
tioned practices.
Economy and efficiency, while necessarily of great importance,
should of course be secondary to quality of work performed. The con-
tinuance of a group retainer (or the extended existence of a house
counsel arrangement) should, as in the corporate model, be dependent
on an educated review of services performed in a given period. The
closed panel conveniently lends itself to such a review. Records,
files, and attorneys are in one place and easily accessible; lines of
control and authority are readily apparent; complaints and grievances
are centrally located and easily amenable to correction, thus making
it easier to focus on weak spots in the operation. Central accessibility
is another bonus, with the closed panel.
The Open Panel
Arguments favoring legal insurance emphasize that the open
panel is the only plan providing for "free choice" of an attorney, and
that legal insurance is not the "limited coverage-highly expensive"
gargantuan that some might suppose. In addition, its proponents raise
several serious questions and criticisims of the closed panel.
The argument for legal insurance is handicapped somewhat by
a lack of statistical data in the area. The idea within the American
legal framework can be traced back twenty years.45 Actual implemen-
tation of open panel projects has been rare, and when occasioned,
has involved pilot projects of uncertain general applicability. Con-
sequently, any assertions of favorable or unfavorable cost compari-
sons are, at best, inconclusive.
With such limitations in mind, the Shreveport project provides
a great deal of encouragement to open panel advocates. While Stolz'
preliminary conclusions were based upon benefits for certain narrowly-
(Continued from preceding page)
license, as the layman's work represented the final product of the attorney with little or no
change. It should be noted that Snivety does not represent the modern viewpoint or the
scope of activity of the legal specialist, and that it very likely would not be followed today
due to the increasing support of the organized bar for the expanded use of paraprofessionals
and the great shortages of legal services in many parts of the country. See Brickman, Expan-
sion oj the Lawyeting Process Through a New Delivery System: Emergence and State of
Legal Professionalism, 71 COLUNLREv. 1153 (1971); see also Symposium on Legal Para-
professionals, 24 VAND.L.REV. 1077 (1971).
MWhile the "art" of marriage counseling is rather undeveloped, there are no indications that
a lawyer is any more equipped for such counseling than is a social worker or psychologist.
In fact, nothing in the standard curriculum of legal education would appear to qualify the
attorney for such a role.
45See L. Brown, Legal-Cost Insuranee, 354 INs.L.J. 475 (1952) (probably the first to publicly
propose the ideas); tee generally Stolz, spura note 1, at 417 n. 1.
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defined categories, the architects of the Shreveport Plan almost en-
tirely abandoned this categorical approach in favor of paying benefits
in terms of genuine work tasks performed by attorneys. Thus, the
program covers annual expenses up to one hundred dollars for advice
and consultation; pays up to two hundred fifty dollars (after a ten
dollar deductible) for office work; provides three hundred twenty-five
dollars (after a twenty-five dollar deductible) for plaintiff's legal
services in court cases, as well as an additional forty dollars for court
costs; pays one hundred fifty dollars for "out of pocket expenses";
and also covers the insured for eight hundred dollars for defendant's
representation (civil or criminal) along with a major legal benefit
of eighty percent of the next one thousand dollars of incurred expenses.
Aside from a list of exemptions comparing favorably with most
closed panel plans, the Shreveport plan provides for broader protec-
tions than was hitherto considered feasible.
The open panel would also appear to avoid many of the ethical
problems raised by the closed panel. Chief among these is the fear
that the group entity itself will interfere with the attorney-client
relationship. Such a worry is not without merit, as some group of-
ficials, for example, may well tend to view the closed panel as "their"
law firm and thus seek special favors, or attempt to influence general
policy - or worse yet, an individual case. Another ticklish situation
arises if the group client decides to sue either the group entity itself,
or the employer who finances the plan. While such suits are usually
exempt from coverage, there is a very real concern that undue influ-
ence could be applied to the client or the closed panel attorneys.
Under the open panel plans, however, the attorneys utilized
would be further removed from the group itself and, consequently, far
less prone to be objects of undue influence.
The most acclaimed attribute of the open panel, however, is its
preservation of the individual's option to choose the attorney of his
choice. Such plans would leave undisturbed (or perhaps enhance) ex-
isting attorney-client relationships, and those who do not have an
attorney would be free to enter the legal marketplace and voluntarily
choose their own.
Conclusion
It is a matter of some speculation whether legal insurance will
prove to be economically feasible. In abandoning Stolz' emphasis on
a narrow categorical approach, the Shreveport designers have sim-
ilarly abandoned the well-researched pronouncements of economic
feasibility enunciated by the Stolz study. If feasible, however, the
open panel would appear to be most attractive to groups possessing
a fair degree of legal sophistication, and a high incidence of existing
attorney-client relationships. For such individuals, the "preventive-
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educational" features of the closed panel would be relatively unim-
portant, as all that may be desired is insurance to purchase legal
services, should the need arise. The institution of a closed panel sys-
tem for such groups may prove both divisive and unpopular.
Similarly, the closed panel is favorable for groups unwilling to
gamble on the long-term economics of legal insurance and desiring to
institute an effective program of preventive legal care. Closed panels
are structured to encourage more frequent attorney-client relation-
ships, and possess the requisite "economics of scale" made possible
by, among other things, the intelligent utilization of the specialist
and the paraprofessional. Groups gaining maximum benefits from
such plans will probably have membership with limited legal acumen
and a low incidence of existing attorney-client relationships.
For groups closest to the latter description, the entire freedom
of choice issue may be little more than jingoistic fancy. One observer,"
for example, argues that "ihere is a vast difference between the
abstraction of a free selection in the market place and the reality of
how people really get to lawyers," reasoning that most people are
referred to attorneys by third parties and that the Shreveport data
indicates the group entity replaces the friend or neighbor as the
source of referrals.
Leaving aside semantic distinctions and the causal factors under-
lying the dynamics of the legal marketplace, it is true that only the
open panel allows an individual to choose his own lawyer. It also is
true, however, that for too many of the legally disenfranchised (in
the A.B.A.'s words) ". . . consulting a lawyer of their choice is not
a part of their lifestyle. 47 Since most closed panel plans exclude
traditional fee-generating cases (such as personal injury and work-
men's compensation), the areas in which the middle class traditionally
had some degree of freedom of choice are effectively preserved. Even
in such areas, however, freedom to choose is meaningless if one does
not recognize situations calling for the exercise of this freedom.
How free, then, is the choice of the individual? Can it not also
be asserted that for many there is a certain freedom in not having
to choose; in knowing that the firm which handles the legal work for
your group is staffed by competent attorneys specializing in the area
of your needs? To those who presently have little inclination or under-
Addrecss by Ray Marks, Professor of Law U. of Chi. Legal Affairs Conference of the Louisiana
branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, in New Orleans, Dec. 16, 1972. Reprinted in
GROUP LEGAL SERVICES NEWS, Dec. 1972.
4 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, COMMENT, in REVISED HAND.
BOOK ON PREPAID LRGAL SERVICES 9 (April, 1972).
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standing to consult with an attorney when needed, life can hold far
more tragic consequences than those attendant to the loss of this
largely illusory "freedom."
A word of caution must also be noted in regard to the seemingly
geometric increase of activity in planning and implementing pro-
grams of legal services. The development of the area, in terms of
studies corroborating the existence and identification of specific needs
among different middle income groups for additional legal services,
represents to no small degree a behavorial scientist's nightmare. As
stated earlier, there is a notable absence of research defining and pin-
pointing the needs of the various socioeconomic groupings which rep-
resent the middle class. It is hoped that a well-designed program of
prepaid legal services for a particular group would be prefaced by
substantial socioscientific inquiries aimed at ascertaining the type
of program best suited to the individual constitutents of the group.
Finally, it should also be noted that neither the open nor the
closed panel represents a complete solution for the legal problems of
the middle class. Legal insurance is essentially a system of distribut-
ing the expense of a future event among a broadly-based group. Since
the insurable event (the legal problems of the middle class) are of a
high frequency-low cost nature,48 legal insurance will probably not
reduce the long-term costs of legal services to the individual, but will
merely provide a vehicle for one to lessen future expenses by pre-
paying such costs in small periodic amounts, to an insurance entity.
The closed panel, on the other hand, while more economical and effi-
cient, will only be available to members of defined groups,4' and thus
will not be of service to the great number of middle class persons who
have no group identification. There is little reason, however, why such
individuals could not be serviced by private law firms utilizing many
of the same structural devices and economics of scale as would the
envisioned closed-panel firms. Such firms would be able to provide
high quality-low cost legal services to those persons who are not within
the scope of closed panel coverage. Recently, such "legal clinics" have
begun operations in parts of California, and reportedly are being
harassed by local and state bar associations.i' If the organized bar is
truly concerned with providing the middle class with meaningful
access to the legal system, it should encourage rather than suppress
such efforts, in the realization that prepaid legal services represents
only a partial answer to the legal dilemma of middle America.
48Stolz, supra note 1, at 422.
49A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §DR2-103 (D) (5) (1971).
50 Disco & Meyers, Legal Supermarkets, 257 HARPER'S, July, 1973 at 30.
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